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Abstract. With the introduction of NGNs, operators need to upgrade their 
access networks because in several cases, existing access networks can no  
longer meet increasing customer expectations. Evolving consumer expectations 
will require changes to the existing access network – next generation access. 
However, existing technologies faces some difficulties and are not ready for 
large-scale roll-out yet. For example, in the case of DSL technologies, the great 
majority of operators with copper networks are improving their networks,  
making investments to deploy fiber optics closer to customers and offering 
higher-speed access, which is required for new emerging services (reducing the 
distance between fiber and the users.). The entry of new competitors can be 
based on the resale of services from the incumbent, on building up their own  
infrastructures, on renting unbundled infrastructure from incumbents, or, on the 
combination of the above elements. Then, is important create the right incentive 
for operators to make an efficient build/buy choice and define the appropriate 
pricing principles. 
Keywords: NGNs, Broadband Access Networks, Telecommunication network 
operators, policy and regulation. 
1 Introduction 
The advent of NGN (new network technologies, access infrastructures, and even 
services) has changed the concept of telecommunication networks and has pro-
found implications for operators and regulators. The definition of policies and 
regulations for competition in the access networks constitute one of the most de-
bated issues in telecommunications today. The regulation of telecommunications 
networks and services is seen as a necessary requirement in most countries to meet 
government objectives and to ensure public interest. Regulation is fundamental to 
generate positive welfare effects where markets alone would not tend to perfect 
competition.  
But, as referred by [1], the major problem is how to measure these welfare effects, 
as they can occur as consumer surplus, producer surplus, societal gains (e.g., in-
creased tax income, better working conditions, etc.). Their empirical study uses price 
situation to examine the welfare effects measured by the state of competition.  
They assumed that the increase of competition reduces prices in the market and that 
competition can also increase consumer welfare without reducing prices (achieved by 
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innovation). Public policies should promote an efficient investment and competition 
in all markets (see fig. 1). 
The two main economic reasons that have been used to justify interventions in 
access networks are the beliefs that access networks constitute a natural monopoly for 
which competition is not feasible in principle and that regulation is, therefore, neces-
sary to control monopoly power and to achieve universal service in which all (or 
most) users have the opportunity to affordably access the services of the network. The 
challenge of telecom operators to provide a profitable deployment of broadband ser-
vices depends if is a high or a low competition area. In areas with high competition 
already exists competition between broadband network operators, and the main ques-
tion is know the market share of all intervenient. However, in low competition areas 
high investments cost must be incurred to promote broadband. [2] argued that national 
or regional policy concerns can also affect NGA roll out. Without some type of inter-
vention, there is the risk for a new digital divide, with urban customers on short loops 
being able to receive IPTV/multi-media services and HDTV while those in rural areas 
might not be able to receive such services. Therefore, the access network poses  
serious challenges to the regulator [3].  
The question then becomes whether it is more important to stimulate investment or 
to ensure competition. Investment in network quality is important for consumers be-
cause it provides access to both better quality and speed to services, such as Web 
browsing and email, and services that require more bandwidth, such as video. Invest-
ment in network quality also improves the service value for consumers and attracts 
new consumers to the market. Therefore, there are two major options for access regula-
tion [2]: temporary or permanent deregulation (i.e., the removal of sector-specific rules 
and regulations) or mandated access (i.e., the obligation to grant access to bottleneck 
facilities at a regulated price and quality). Deregulation increases investment incen-
tives, as it overcomes the “truncating problem” and allows above-normal profits. How-
ever, in the absence of alternative infrastructures or in areas of low population density 
under limited competition or the threat of entry into the upstream market, an integrated 
incumbent might leverage its market power to competitive downstream segments.  
For NRAs, one request of decisive importance is if they must foster service-based 
competition in the first phase of liberalization or to focus on infrastructure-based 
competition. This decision (infrastructure or service-based) would lead to lower pric-
es, more differentiated and innovative products and improved services for consumers. 
When access is available at different levels of the incumbent’s network, new entrants 
will be able invest in the infrastructure gradually as sufficient economies of scale 
became achievable - This concept is the ladder of infrastructure competition. This 
concept defends that new entrants (or access seekers) may enter the market offering 
broadband access by reselling the wholesale services of the incumbent operator  
(requires least investment) where they only cover minor elements of the value  
chain (Figure 2). When the number of customer grows and financial means become 
available, the operator move on to higher rungs of the ladder [1, 4]. Next, new  
entrants need to building their own infrastructure and acquiring only the residual  
infrastructure from the incumbent's wholesale department. This includes a move for 
the operators from service to infrastructure-based competition. 
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The migration to NGAN has raised a range of issues related to building wiring 
and infrastructure sharing. The deployment strategies for operators and entrants are 
completely different. In addition, parameters, such as existent infrastructure, geo-
graphical characteristics, infrastructure renting costs, and consumer willingness to 
pay, influence the definition of the strategy. So, telecommunication operators can 
select among a set of deployment strategies that are characterized by path depen-
dency and diminishing usage of the legacy copper loop. The range of the selection 
space is based upon how much of the copper they use and, consequently, how far 
toward the customer they deploy new fiber. In the final step, operators replace all of 
the copper with FTTH. Within that scenario, FTTH can be implemented as either 
active Ethernet or passive optical networks, although most incumbent operators 




Fig. 1. Policies effects [5] 
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Fig. 2. Ladder of investment [6, 7] 
The strategy of a new entrant in an access network that does not have an infra-
structure can be one of the following three alternatives (Fig. 3): (1) Renting infra-
structure (i.e. conduit, cable, equipment, ...) from other operators and offering only 
services (infrastructure sharing); (2) Deploying a new infrastructure; or (3) Not 
participating at all.  
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Fig. 3. Deployment strategies for incumbent operators and new entrants [8, 9] 
Regulators must decide whether to promote competition on the basis of a single in-
frastructure with regulated access (service competition) or to encourage the build-up 
of competing, parallel infrastructures (infrastructure competition) [10]. Then, is im-
portant create the right incentive for operators to make an efficient build/buy choice 
and define the appropriate pricing principles. To obtain economic efficiency, a regula-
tor should [6]: (1) Encourage the use of existing infrastructure of the incumbent  
operator where this is economically desirable, avoiding inefficient duplication of  
infrastructure costs by new entrants (incentive to buy); and (2) Encourage investment 
in new infrastructure where this is economically justified by (a) new entrants invest-
ing in competing infrastructure, and (b) the incumbent operator upgrading and  
expanding its networks (incentive to build). 
In this context, the cost models are fundamental in the determination of the access 
price that can be used by regulators in the definition of wholesale prices. 
2 Infrastructure-Based Competition 
European Commission argues that infrastructure-based competition is the best and 
fastest way for broadband development. The arguments are that infrastructure based 
competition provides efficiency incentives to operators, reduces prices, increase pene-
tration, stimulates innovation, etc. The empirical study deployed by [1] concludes that 
prices are lower and penetration rates are higher in those countries with predominant-
ly infrastructure-based competition. However, broadband development and infrastruc-
ture-based competition has higher costs (the cost of laying out these infrastructures 
and operation inefficiencies of duplicating/redundant infrastructures).  
The entry of competitors in the infrastructure-based market is dependent on the 
cost of the alternative technology. An efficient market entry is based in retail rates and 
access prices (reflect the cost of using the incumbent’s network). So, infrastructure-
based entrants can offer differentiated services at equal (or lower) costs (and thereby 
increase consumer welfare), when the cost of providing broadband access by an  
alternative network is lower (or equal) than the incumbent’s cost of providing broad-
band access services [11]. The share of LLU is increasing in favor of bitstream 
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access. This could be understood that the competition in the lowest possible layers 
allows more degrees of freedom to differentiate. However, competition in this layers 
could not be not technically feasible (e.g., constraints in ducts or sewers implies that 
fiber cables cannot be installed) or economically feasible (e.g., in rural areas where 
the business case for FTTH isn’t attractive). 
2.1 Build or Upgrade Infrastructure 
In NGNs, infrastructure-based entry into the local loop can occur in two ways: by 
constructing new networks (greenfield approach) or by upgrading existing networks 
[12]. Upgrading existing networks can be driven by the increase in number of  
subscribers, the introduction of new services, the conversion to broadband access 
infrastructure, or modernization of existing access solutions using different access 
technology than previously installed.  
With the exception of wireless networks, which constitute a low-cost investment, 
the construction of parallel infrastructures that are similar in costs and capabilities 
remains unlikely in NGNs. However, providers can enter the market successfully by 
deploying a superior network with lower costs and/or higher quality alongside an 
existing infrastructure. In many European countries, next generation access will most 
commonly use FTTCabinet architecture. The replacement of the traditional copper-
based access with new fiber-based access potentially both enables a significant in-
crease in the capacity and ability to support new services and lowers operating and 
maintenance costs as compared to copper [13]. However, the initial cost of deploying 
it is substantial. Alternative operators require access to civil engineering. For an oper-
ator rolling out a fiber optical network, access to existing civil engineering changes 
the economic equation considerably. Therefore, all operators are not on equal footing. 
Alternative operators have begun to introduce optical fiber only in large markets. In 
addition, incumbent operators are rolling out optical fiber in their civil engineering 
ducts, which they inherited from the former monopoly. 
NGA fiber rollout requires substantial investment, and incumbents are better posi-
tioned than new entrants to make these investments on a large scale because of the 
associated lower costs of infrastructure usage, investment savings by dismantling 
MDFs, better use of passive infrastructure, and larger subscriber base [5]. The tech-
nologies used by most, but not all, network operators are FTTC/VDSL and FTTH/B 
(P2P and PON). The FTTC/VDSL solution uses copper access line from the network 
operator’s MDF in the CO, to the street cabinet is replaced by a fiber optic line. In 
FTTH PtP networks, the copper access line from the network operator’s CO to the 
end user’s residence is replaced by a fiber optic line that is effectively dedicated to a 
single customer. In FTTH (PON) the copper access line from the network operator’s 
CO to the end user’s residence is replaced by a fiber optic line.  
3 Service-Based Competition 
The large investments required to build/upgrade a network capable of supporting 
broadband access services could be a barrier to enter into the market. [14] argues that 
service-based competition is only viable with regulatory intervention in the market. 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRA) intervention is important for regulation costly 
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and to offer the right incentives for innovation and cost-minimization. For that, the 
regulators need correct information on technologies, costs, market, etc.  
By NRA definition, incumbent networks were opened to facilitate competition. 
With this policy, new entrants could rent the elements of the incumbents’ networks 
with stipulated prices, which enabled competitors to utilize last-mile incumbent  
network facilities at cost-oriented prices under the following arrangements [15-16]: 
Bitstream access, Local loop unbundling (LLU), and shared access. The report from 
the ERG [7] identified LLU and wholesale broadband access (Bitstream) as key areas 
where harmonization might significantly help deliver benefits of a single electronic 
communications market.  
Mandated access to the bitstream or the unbundled line reduces uncertainty and 
protects competition in the downstream market, although the effects on investment 
depend upon the allowed margin. Further, regulated access to cable ducts can help 
competitors to deploy, restructure, or upgrade their access infrastructure. In NGNs, 
physical unbundling becomes increasingly difficult with the rollout of FTTH deploy-
ments, as current points of interconnection, such as the MDF or the street cabinets, 
become obsolete and are phased out. In the case of FTTH, investments by competitors 
to interconnect physical access points in the local loop might ultimately be stranded. 
4 Wholesale Access Services 
Some operators have decided to share their networks under several options in order  
to reduce their CAPEX and OPEX (e.g., ducts, fiber, site sharing, etc.). For new  
entrants, is possible without higher investments in local loops, reduce the risks of 
entry, which leads in the long run to more investment in alternative access network 
infrastructures [17]. Table 1 presents the types of wholesale access. 








Is the recommendation by which incumbent operators are obliged to open 
their copper-based line access networks other operators (new entrants). In the 
case of full unbundling, a copper pair is rented to a third party for its exclusive 
use. This access method uses the incumbent’s copper access line from the CO 
to the customer premises, but the LLU operator provides its own electronics at 




Shared access lines supplied by the incumbent to other operators (new en-
trants). A fundamental feature of shared access is that it is provided over a 
subset of the full frequency spectrum of the line (copper, coax, fiber, …). 
Cable is a separate access network generally not owned by the incumbent 
operator, except in Portugal [189]. The cost of the line is shared between the 
shared access services.  
Bitstream 
access 
It refers to the situation where the incumbent installs a high-speed access link 
to the customer premises, and makes this access link available to new  
entrants, to enable them to provide high-speed services to customers [16]. 
Bitstream access is a wholesale access product which allows alternative  
operators to offer BB Internet access to the final costumer without having an 
own access line [19].  
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4.1 Wholesale Pricing 
One of the variables that can influence the level of competitiveness is the access price 
definition. Access prices are essentially the wholesale prices that network owners 
(normally incumbent operators) charge to the other operators (competitors) for access 
to infrastructure or services provided by the incumbent network infrastructure.  
Where the incumbent’s network is opened to competitors at more than one level 
(e.g. LLU, wholesale broadband access and wholesale line rental), regulators have 
to project correctly the relative prices of the different options in relation to one 
another and in relation to the retail prices prevailing in the market [20]. An incor-
rect definition of the access price can affect the level of competition and welfare 
loss. For example, a lower price will reduce the incentive of the infrastructure 
owners to invest in the infrastructure because they do not receive an adequate  
return on their investment. Further, a higher price will reduce the capacity of  
competitors to compete - a low price for access encourages use but discourages 
investment and vice versa. 
To be able to make the ladder of investment operational it is necessary that pric-
es in wholesale markets are consistent for the different products [1]. The definition 
of access pricing is critical when network access is a vital input to deploying ser-
vices to end consumers. In a market where the network owner also operates at the 
retail market, competing with other firms the access pricing definition is a key 
question and is frequently considered to be an economic regulation problem. To 
assure a legal competition, the NRAs have to control the price scheme of the 
wholesale regimen for the bitstream access services or even determine the upper 
price levels. The EU has to provide the directives to promote homogeneity in the 
price regulation scheme. 
Without access price regulation, network owners may be tempted to exercise 
market power and block access to the network. On the other hand, significant con-
trol of the access price can discourage the realization of investments in the quality 
of the network. Consequently, a lower access price can result in inefficient input, 
whereas a higher access price can lead to inefficient investments with the objective 
of reducing dependence upon the incumbent operator. Then, the regulator can use 
the access pricing definition to influence the decisions of new firms’ inputs in the 
retail segment.  
In Portugal, a recent European Commission report [21] shows that LLU prices 
have not been modified and continue to be just above the EU average. The monthly 
average total cost was €10.05 for full unbundling and €3.57 for shared access in  
October 2010 (compared to EU averages of €9.61 and €3.29 respectively).  
4.2 Wholesale Access Market 
For new entrants, LLU (fully unbundled lines and shared access) is the main  
wholesale access with 76.2% (in January 2011) of DSL lines, up from 65.2% in July 
2008 (Source: EC).  New entrants' use of bitstream access for local loop unbundling 
in the provision of broadband services went up by 1 percentage point since July 2008. 
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The share of resale, which represents a type of access for low-investment intensive 
new entrants, has shrunk by 7.6 % during the last year. Previous figure shows the 
evolution since 2007 of DSL lines by type of access. 
Table 2 presents the types of access of the new entrants for Portugal and EU. In 
Portugal, LLU continues to be the preferred wholesale option for alternative opera-
tors, with 83.4% (2010) of lines. However, the number of fully unbundled lines 
(shared access is not used) for the provision of broadband services has decreased 
from 269.066 in January 2010 to 229.098 in January 2011 [21]. Table 2 shows that 
there is a bigger difference in the use of shared access between Portugal and EU 
average. 
Table 2. New entrants` DSL lines by type of access (EU and Portugal), 2009/11 (Source: EC) 
Type of  
access 
EU level Portugal 
2009 2010 Jan. 2011 2009 2010 
Own network 0,9% 0,9% 1.2% 0,0% 0,0% 
Full ULL 54,4% 61,5% 63.9% 86,6% 83,4% 
Shared access 16,9% 13,3% 12.3% 0,0% 0,0% 
Bitstream 17,0% 15,4% 14.5% 13,4% 16,4% 
Resale 10,7% 8,9% 8.1% 0,0% 0,2% 
 
In Portugal, competition is strong in urban areas, where unbundling is highly de-
veloped, but in rural areas, incumbent operator remains largely dominant. In 2009, the 
% of DSL connections was different by type of provider: a) Urban area - ULL:41,0%, 
Bitstream/Resale:4,0% and Incumbent retail:55,0%; b) Rural area - ULL: 8,5%,  
Bitstream / Resale: 5,5% and Incumbent retail: 86,0%. [6] defends that an effective 
and sustainable infrastructure competition is superior to service competition, as it 
allows for head-to-head competition between operators and requires a minimal need 
for regulatory intervention with competitors not being reliant on the incumbent infra-
structure. So, operators, especially new entrants, will have a choice as to whether they 
should invest in their own infrastructure (i.e. build) in order to provide services  
to end-users, or to seek access (buy) from an existing provider (normally the  
incumbent). 
5 Conclusion 
The analysis of the broadband market suggests that where infrastructure competi-
tion exists, as in DSL and wireless broadband, service providers will more aggres-
sively price their offerings, driving down the access price for consumers. However, 
in the case of limited infrastructure competition, broadband access price remains 
high for consumers. Infrastructure competition between DSL, Cable and wireless 
solution, had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. We 
verify that opening access networks (and network elements) to competitive forces 
increases investment and the speed of development. Despite increasing competition, 
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incumbents are maintaining their dominant position. More than 60% of all broad-
band subscriptions make use of incumbent’s broadband access infrastructure. In 
countries/regions where alternative technological platforms are not developed, the 
deployment of the DSL technology depends on the use of the networks infrastruc-
tures that are propriety of incumbent operators. To facilitate market entry of new 
competitors and develop competition in the access market, the regulatory authorities 
are focused on unbundled access to the local loop (fully unbundled local loop and 
shared access to the local loop) and on different forms of network access (bitstream 
and resale). 
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